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Abstract—A number of important applied problems in engi-
neering, finance and medicine can be formulated as a problem of
anomaly detection based on a one-class classification. A classical
approach to this problem is to describe a normal state using a
one-class support vector machine. Then to detect anomalies we
quantify a distance from a new observation to the constructed
description of the normal class. In this paper we present a new
approach to one-class classification. We formulate a new problem
statement and a corresponding algorithm that allow taking into
account privileged information during the training phase. We
evaluate performance of the proposed approach using synthetic
datasets, as well as the publicly available Microsoft Malware
Classification Challenge dataset.
I. INTRODUCTION
Anomaly detection refers to the problem of finding patterns
in data that do not conform to an expected behaviour. Anomaly
detection finds extensive use in a wide variety of applications
such as fraud detection for credit cards, insurance or health
care, intrusion detection for cyber-security, fault detection in
safety critical systems, and military surveillance for enemy ac-
tivities [1], [2], [3]. A classical approach to anomaly detection
is to describe expected (“normal”) behaviour using one-class
classification techniques, i.e. to construct a description of a
“normal” state using a number of examples, e.g. by describing
a geometrical place of training patterns in a feature space. If
a new test pattern does not belong to the “normal” class then
we consider it to be anomalous.
To construct a “normal” domain we can use well-known
approaches such as the Support Vector Domain Description
(SVDD) [4], [5] and the One-Class Support Vector Machine
(One-Class SVM) [6], possibly combined with model selection
for anomaly detection [7], resampling [8], ensembling of
“weak” anomaly detectors [9] and extraction of important
features using manifold learning methods [10], [11]. Both
SVDD and One-Class SVM can be kernelized to describe a
complex nonlinear “normal” class.
For the original two-class Support Vector Machine [12]
Vapnik recently proposed a modification that allows taking
into account privileged information during the training phase
to improve a classification accuracy [13]. Let us provide some
examples of privileged information. If we solve an image clas-
sification problem, then as privileged information we can use
a textual image description. In case of a malware detection we
can use a source code of a malware to get additional features
for the classification. Such information is not available during
the test phase (e.g. it could be computationally prohibitive
or too costly to obtain), when we use the trained model for
anomaly detection and classification, but can be used during
the training phase.
In this work we combine these two concepts (SVMs and
learning using privileged information) and propose new ap-
proaches to train SVDD and One-Class SVM with privileged
information, under the intuition that this additional information
available at the training time can be utilized to better define
the “normal” state. Through experiments on synthetic data and
some real data from the Malware Classification Challenge
(see [14]), we show that a model, trained with privileged
information, performs better than a model, trained without
privileged information. However, we do not want to claim that
the used setup of malware classification experiments indeed
fully reflects a specificity of cyber security applications. Rather
we demonstrate that one-class classification with privileged
information is useful for cyber security problems.
II. ONE-CLASS SVM AND SVDD
Below we briefly describe two classical approaches to one-
class classification. We are given an i.i.d. sample patterns
(x1, . . . , xl) ∈ X ⊂ Rn. The main idea of these algorithms
is to separate a major part of sample patterns, considered to
be “normal”, from those ones, considered to be “abnormal” in
some sense.
A. One-Class SVM
In case of the original One-Class SVM [6] we consider
those patterns to be abnormal, which are close to origin of
coordinates in a feature space.
Let us separate patterns using a hyperplane in a feature
space defined by some feature map φ(·) and a normal vector
to the hyperplane w. We consider that a pattern x belongs to
a “normal” class if (w · φ(x)) > ρ. In order to define the
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hyperplane, i.e. the normal vector w and the value of ρ, we
solve an optimization problem
1
2
‖w‖2`2 +
1
νl
l∑
i=1
ξi − ρ→ min
w,ξ,ρ
(1)
s.t. (w · φ(xi)) ≥ ρ− ξi, ξi ≥ 0.
Here ν is a regularization coefficient, ξi is a slack variable for
the i-th pattern.
Optimization problem (1) is convex, therefore its solution
coincides with that of the dual one:
−
l∑
i=1
l∑
j=1
αiαjK(xi, xj)→ max
α
(2)
s.t.
l∑
i=1
αi = 1, 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1
νl
.
Here the scalar product (φ(xi) · φ(xj)) is replaced by the
corresponding kernel function K(xi, xj). Therefore as usual
we do not need to know an explicit representation of φ(x) in
order to solve the dual problem. Moreover, the solution of the
primal problem can be represented through the solution of the
dual problem, namely w =
l∑
i=1
αiφ(xi).
Thanks to the structure of (2) if some αi > 0, then the
pattern xi belongs to the boundary of the “normal” domain,
i.e. (w · φ(xi)) = ρ [6]. Thus the offset ρ can be recovered
by exploiting the fact that for any αi > 0 the corresponding
pattern xi satisfies the equality
ρ = (w · φ(xi)) =
l∑
j=1
αjK(xj , xi).
As a result the corresponding decision rule has the form
f(x) =
l∑
i=1
αiK(xi, x)− ρ.
In case f(x) > 0 a pattern x is considered to belong to the
“normal” class and vice versa.
B. SVDD
Another approach to anomaly detection is to separate out-
lying patterns using a sphere [4], [5]. As before we denote by
φ(·) some feature map. Let a be some point in the image of
the feature map and R be some positive value. We consider
that a pattern x belongs to a “normal” class, if it is located
inside the sphere ‖a−φ(x)‖2`2 ≤ R. In order to find the center
a and the radius R we solve the optimization problem
R+
1
νl
l∑
i=1
ξi → min
R,a,ξi
(3)
s.t. ‖φ(xi)− a‖2`2 ≤ R+ ξi, ξi ≥ 0.
Here ξi is a distance from the pattern xi, located out of the
sphere, to the surface of the sphere. On the face of it, the
variable R can be considered as a radius only if we require its
positivity. However, it can be easily proved that this condition
is automatically fulfilled if ν ∈ (0, 1) [5], and for ν 6∈ (0, 1)
the solution of (3) is degenerate.
The dual problem has the form
l∑
i=1
αiK(xi, xi)−
l∑
i=1
l∑
j=1
αiαjK(xi, xj)→ max
α
s.t. 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1
νl
,
l∑
i=1
αi = 1.
As in the previous case here we replace the scalar product
(φ(xi) · φ(xj)) with the corresponding kernel K(xi, xj).
We can write out the solution of the primal problem using
the solution of the dual problem
a =
l∑
i=1
αiφ(xi), R = ‖φ(xj)‖2`2 − 2(a · φ(xj)) + ‖a‖2`2 ,
where in order to calculate R we can use any xj , such
that αj > 0. Here ‖φ(x)‖2`2 = K(x, x), (φ(x) · a) =∑l
i=1 αiK(xi, x) and ‖a‖2`2 =
∑l
i=1
∑l
j=1 αiαjK(xi, xj).
The decision function has the form
f(x) = K(x, x)− 2
l∑
i=1
αiK(x, xi) + ‖a‖2`2 −R.
If f(x) > 0, then a pattern x is located outside the sphere and
is considered to be anomalous.
III. PRIVILEGED INFORMATION
Let us assume that during the training phase we have
some privileged information: besides patterns (x1, . . . , xl) ∈
X ⊂ Rn (original information) we also have additional
patterns (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
l ) ∈ X ∗ ⊂ Rm. This additional (priv-
ileged) information is not available on the test phase, i.e.
we are going to train our decision rule on pairs of patterns
(x, x∗) ∈ X ∪ X ∗ ⊂ Rn+m, but when making decisions we
can use only test patterns x ∈ X .
Let us discuss how this privileged information can be
incorporated in the considered problem statements. In the
original approaches to one-class classification we assume that
the slack variables ξi, characterizing the distance from the
patterns xi to the separating boundary, are determined through
the solution of the corresponding optimization problem (see
(1) or (3)). Now let us assume that the slack variables can be
modelled as
ξi = ξi(x
∗
i ) = (φ
∗(x∗i ) · w∗) + b∗, (4)
where φ∗(·) is a feature map in the space of privileged
patterns. Thus, we assume that using the privileged patterns
(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
l ) we can refine the location of the separating
boundary w.r.t. the sample of training objects.
A. One-Class SVM+
Let us modify problem statement (1) in order to incorporate
privileged information:
νl
2
‖w‖2`2 +
γ
2
‖w∗‖2`2 − νlρ+
l∑
i=1
[(w∗ · φ∗(x∗i )) + b∗ + ζi]→ min
w,w∗,b∗,ρ,ζ
(5)
s.t. (w · φ(xi)) ≥ ρ− (w∗ · φ∗(x∗i ))− b∗,
(w∗ · φ∗(x∗i )) + b∗ + ζi ≥ 0, ζi ≥ 0.
Here γ is a regularization parameter for the linear approxima-
tion of the slack variables, ζi are instrumental variables used
to prevent those patterns, belonging to a “positive” half-plane,
from being penalized. Note that if γ → ∞, then the solution
of (5) is close to the original solution of (1).
Let us write out a Lagrangian for (5):
L =
νl
2
‖w‖2`2 − νlρ+
γ
2
‖w∗‖2`2
+
l∑
i=1
[(w∗ · φ∗(x∗i )) + b∗ + ζi]−
l∑
i=1
µiζi
−
l∑
i=1
αi [(w · φ(xi))− ρ+ (w∗ · φ∗(x∗i )) + b∗]
−
l∑
i=1
βi [(w
∗ · φ∗(x∗i )) + b∗ + ζi] .
Setting δi = 1 − βi, from the Karush – Kuhn – Tucker
conditions we get that
w =
1
νl
l∑
i=1
αiφ(xi), w
∗ =
1
γ
l∑
i=1
(αi − δi)φ∗(x∗i ),
δi = µi,
l∑
i=1
δi =
l∑
i=1
αi = νl, 0 ≤ δi ≤ 1.
Using obtained equations, we now can formulate the dual
problem
− 1
2νl
∑
i,j
αiαjK(xi, xj)
−
∑
i,j
1
2γ
(αi − δi)K∗(x∗i , x∗j )(αj − δj)→ max
α,δ
s.t.
l∑
i=1
αi = νl,
l∑
i=1
δi = νl, 0 ≤ δi ≤ 1, αi ≥ 0.
Here we replace the scalar product (φ∗(x∗i ) · φ∗(x∗j )) with
the corresponding kernel function K∗(x∗i , x
∗
j ). At the end, the
decision function has the same form as in the case of the
original One-Class SVM: f(x) =
l∑
i=1
αiK(xi, x)− ρ.
B. SVDD+
Let us modify problem statement (3) in order to incorporate
privileged information:
νlR+
γ
2
‖w∗‖2`2
+
l∑
i=1
[(w∗ · φ∗(x∗i )) + b∗ + ζi]→ min
R,a,w∗,b,ζ
(6)
s.t. ‖φ(xi)− a‖2`2 ≤ R+ [(w · φ∗(x∗i )) + b∗],
(w∗ · φ∗(x∗i )) + b∗ + ζi ≥ 0, ζi ≥ 0.
If γ → ∞, then the solution of (6) is close to the original
solution of (3).
Let us write out a Lagrangian for (6):
L = νlR+
γ
2
‖w∗‖2`2 +
l∑
i=1
[(w∗ · φ∗(x∗i )) + b∗ + ζi]−
l∑
i=1
µiζi
+
l∑
i=1
αi[‖φ(xi)− a‖2`2 −R− (w∗ · φ∗(x∗i ))− b∗]
−
l∑
i=1
βi[(w
∗ · φ∗(x∗i )) + b∗ + ζi].
Setting δi = 1 − βi, from the Karush – Kuhn – Tucker
conditions we get that
w∗ =
1
γ
l∑
i=1
(αi − δi)φ∗(x∗i ), a =
1
νl
l∑
i=1
αiφ(xi),
δi = µi,
l∑
i=1
αi =
l∑
i=1
δi = νl, 0 ≤ δi ≤ 1.
Let us formulate the dual problem:
l∑
i=1
αiK(xi, xi)− 1
2νl
∑
i,j
αiαjK(xi, xj)
−
∑
i,j
1
2γ
(αi − δi)K∗(x∗i , x∗j )(αj − δj)→ max
α,δ
s.t.
l∑
i=1
αi = νl,
l∑
i=1
δi = νl, 0 ≤ δi ≤ 1, αi ≥ 0.
At the end, the decision function has the same form as
in the case of the original SVDD: f(x) = K(x, x) −
2
l∑
i=1
αiK(x, xi) + ‖a‖2`2 −R.
IV. RELATED WORK
In principle some attempts to use privileged information for
one-class classification can be found in the literature. E.g. in
[15] a feature space is divided into a number of meaningful
subdomains X = ∪Nr=1Xr and for each element from the
training sample (x1, . . . , xl) ordinal number of the subdomain,
to which this element belongs to, is used as privileged in-
formation in order to introduce different constraints on the
slack variables for patterns from different subdomains, i.e.
ξi,r = ξr(xi) = (φ
∗
r(xi) · w∗r) + b∗r , xi ∈ Xr, r = 1, . . . , N .
Thus the authors do not explicitly use privileged information
from some other feature space rather then initial one: priv-
ileged information can be straightforwardly calculated from
values of the original patterns (x1, . . . , xl).
In order to construct an anomaly detection rule the authors
propose to solve the following optimization problem:
1
2
‖w‖2`2 +
γ
2
N∑
r=1
‖w∗r‖2`2 +
1
N
N∑
r=1
1
νr
∑
xi∈Xr
[(w∗r · φ∗r(xi)) + b∗r ]− ρ→ min
w,w∗r ,b∗r ,ρ,ζr
(7)
s.t. (w · φ(xi)) ≥ ρ− (w∗r · φ∗r(xi))− b∗r , xi ∈ Xr,
(w∗r · φ∗r(xi)) + b∗r + ζi,r ≥ 0, xi ∈ Xr,
ζi,r ≥ 0.
A shortcoming of the problem statement (7) (cf. with the prob-
lem statement (5)) is that the parameters νr and γ influence the
regularization in a dependent manner, i.e. their contribution to
the regularization can not be disentangled.
A similar framework is used in [16], where, as in the previ-
ous paper, the authors use ordinal numbers of corresponding
subdomains as privileged information. The main difference
with paper [15] is that the SVDD algorithm underlies their
approach. In fact the authors of [16] propose to solve the
following optimization problem in order to find the decision
rule:
R2 +
γ
2
(R∗)2
+
1
νl
l∑
i=1
[‖φ∗(x∗i )− a∗‖2`2 − (R∗)2]→ minR,R∗,a,a∗,ζ (8)
s.t. ‖φ(xi)− a‖2`2 ≤ R2 + ‖φ∗(x∗i )− a∗‖2`2 − (R∗)2,
‖φ∗(x∗i )− a∗‖2`2 − (R∗)2 + ζi ≥ 0,
ζi ≥ 0.
As in the previous example, the parameterization, used in
(8), does not allow to control the regularization in the original
feature space and in the space of privileged information inde-
pendently. One more difference from the problem statement,
proposed in this paper, is another approach to modelling slack
variables ξi. In our approach we use linear model (4), but in
[16] the distance ‖φ∗(x∗i ) − a∗‖2`2 − (R∗)2 to the surface of
the sphere in the privileged space is used.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section we describe performed numerical experi-
ments. We provide results only for the original One-Class
Support Vector Machine and its elaborated extension with
privileged information, since results, based on SVDD, are
comparable. This is not surprising, since when the Gaussian
kernel is used the decision rules for the both methods are
essentially the same, as it follows from the theoretical results
of [5].
A. Data description
We perform experiments using both two-dimensional syn-
thetic data and some real data from the Microsoft Malware
Classification Challenge (BIG 2015), see [14].
We generate the first synthetic dataset (“Mixture of Gaus-
sians”) from a mixture of two-dimensional normal distribu-
tions, with mean values c1 = (2, 2) and c2 = (−2,−2) and
unit covariance matrices I2 ∈ R2×2, i.e.
x ∼ η · N (c1, I2) + (1− η) · N (c2, I2), η ∼ Ber(0.5).
As privileged information we use coordinates of a pattern
after subtracting the nearest mean vector, i.e. x∗ = x −
argminc1,c2(‖x− c1‖, ‖x− c2‖).
We represent the second synthetic dataset (“Circles”) by two
circles of different radii r1 and r2 with common center. We
generate each circle in polar coordinate system, then Cartesian
coordinates of a pattern are calculated:
x = (r · cosφ, r · sinφ),
r = η · I(η > 0), η ∼ N (r0, 0.5),
φ ∼ U [0, 2pi),
where I(·) is an indicator function, U [0, 2pi) is a uniform
distribution, r0 = 5 for the external circle and r0 = 0.5 for
the internal circle. We use Cartesian coordinates as features
and polar coordinates (r, φ) as privileged information.
We generate the third synthetic dataset (“Arc”) in polar
coordinates:
φ ∼ N (0, 0.04),
τ = η · (0.1− |φ|), η ∼ N (−1/2, 1),
x = ((10− τ) · cosφ, (10− τ) · sinφ),
where thanks to the multiplier 0.1−|φ| we get bigger variance
for φ ≈ 0 and as a consequence a banana-like shape of the
dataset. We use Cartesian coordinates as features and polar
coordinates as privileged information.
For some experiments we need to generate a sample with
noise:
• generate a sample without noise,
• estimate bounds [x1,min, x1,max]× [x2,min, x2,max] of the
sample,
• generate noise using uniform distribution U [a1, a2] ×
U [b1, b2], where a1 = x1,min − 0.5 · (x1,max − x1,min),
a2 = x1,max+0.5 · (x1,max−x1,min), b1 = x2,min−0.5 ·
(x2,max−x2,min), b2 = x2,max+0.5 · (x2,max−x2,min).
Thus the region of the feature space, in which anomalies are
located, includes all patterns of a “normal” data.
Examples of synthetic data are given in figure 1.
B. Proportion of discarded test sample patterns
In case of the original One-Class SVM a number of test
patterns, marked by the decision rule as anomalous, depends
on the regularization parameter ν [12], [4] in a very certain
way: it tends to ν if the training sample size increases and
(a) Mixture of Gaussians (b) Mixture of Gaussians, privi-
leged feature space
(c) Circles (d) Circles, privileged feature space
(e) Arc (f) Arc, privileged feature space
Fig. 1: Examples of synthetic datasets
both the test sample and the train sample are generated from
the same distribution.
Using synthetic datasets let us check how the proportion
of test sample patterns, marked as anomalous, depends on the
regularization parameters ν and γ. We use the Gaussian kernel
K(x, x′) = exp(−‖x − x′‖2/σ2) with σ2 = 2 both for the
original feature space, and for the privileged feature space.
Results are provided in figure 2. We can notice that for small
values of ν (significant regularization of the privileged space)
this dependence is similar with that for the original One-Class
SVM.
C. Accuracy of Anomaly Detection
For this experiment we generate samples with outliers using
the approach, described in subsection V-A. The proportion of
outliers is equal to 10%. For training of the One-Class SVM+
(a) Arc (b) Circles
(c) Mixture of Gaussians
Fig. 2: Synthetic datasets. Proportion of test sample patterns,
marked as anomalous by One-Class SVM+
we use an unlabeled sample. To assess the accuracy we calcu-
late area under the precision/recall curve using the test sample.
Also we compare this accuracy with that of the original One-
Class SVM. The main issue when performing comparison is
how to set values for the regularization parameters and the
kernel widths. Let us comment on this issue:
• In order to tune the regularization parameter ν and the
kernel width σ for the original One-Class SVM, we
perform a grid search in order to maximize area under the
precision/recall curve, estimated by the cross-validation
procedure. We denote obtained “optimal” values by νopt
and σopt and provide the corresponding anomaly detec-
tion accuracy in figure 3.
• For the One-Class SVM+ we tune only the regularization
parameter γ and the kernel width σ∗, responsible for
the “privileged” part of optimization problem (5). As
above, we optimize area under the precision/recall curve,
estimated by the cross-validation procedure. In this case
we set values of the parameters ν and σ to νopt and σopt
correspondingly, which are optimal for the original One-
Class SVM. The idea is that if privileged information
does not provide any improvement over the original
information, the parameter γ can be set to some big value
and the “privileged” part of optimization problem (5) will
not have any influence on the overall solution. We provide
typical values of the anomaly detection accuracy for the
One-Class SVM+ in figure 4. We can see that privileged
information allows obtaining significant increase of area
under the precision/recall curve.
Dataset/Method One-Class SVM One-Class SVM+
Arc 0.25 0.67
Circles 0.56 0.96
Mixture of Gaussians 0.55 0.98
TABLE I: Synthetic datasets. Accuracy of anomaly detection
(a) Arc (b) Circles
(c) Mixture of Gaussians
Fig. 3: Synthetic datasets. Area under the precision/recall
curve for the original One-Class SVM
Accuracy of anomaly detection for synthetic datasets is re-
ported in table I.
D. Microsoft Malware Classification Challenge
Zero-day cyber attacks such as worms and spy-ware are
becoming increasingly widespread and dangerous. The exist-
ing signature-based intrusion detection mechanisms are often
not sufficient in detecting these types of attacks. As a result,
anomaly intrusion detection methods have been developed
to cope with zero-day cyber attacks. Among the variety of
common anomaly detection approaches [17], [18], the support
vector machine is known to be one of the best machine
learning algorithms to classify abnormal behaviour [19]. In this
section we demonstrate the applicability of the proposed One-
Class SVM modification to cyber attacks detection using a
real data from the Microsoft Malware Classification Challenge
[14].
In the framework of the Microsoft Malware Classification
Challenge a set of known malware files, representing a mix
of nine different malware families, is provided. Each malware
file has an Id, a 20 character hash value uniquely identifying
the file, and a Class, an integer representing one of nine
(a) Arc (b) Circles
(c) Mixture of Gaussians
Fig. 4: Synthetic datasets. Area under the precision/recall
curve for the One-Class SVM+
family names to which the malware may belong: Ramnit,
Lollipop, Kelihos ver3, Vundo, Simda, Tracur, Kelihos ver1,
Obfuscator.ACY, Gatak. For each file the raw data contains the
hexadecimal representation of the file’s binary content, without
the PE header (to ensure sterility). A metadata manifest is
also provided, which is a log containing various metadata
information extracted from the binary, such as function calls,
strings, etc. This was generated using the IDA disassembler
tool. The task, proposed to the participants of the challenge,
was to develop the best mechanism for classifying files from
the test set into their respective family affiliations using binary
files and assembly code.
In order to test our approach to anomaly detection with
privileged information we use the same methodology of fea-
ture generation, as that initially proposed by the winning
team [20]. Using binary files we calculate frequencies of
bytes and number of different four-grams. From the assembly
code we calculate frequencies of each command, a number of
calls to external dll files. Also we use transformation of the
assembly code to an image, since malwares can be visualized
as grayscale images from byte files or from asm files [21],
[22]: each byte is from 0 to 255 so it can be easily translated
into pixel intensity. Details of the transformation can be found
in [20]. Thus we use features based on image textures which
are commonly used in scene category classification such as
coast, mountain, forest, street, etc. Here, instead of scene
categories, we have malware families.
Finally, as the original features we use information, obtained
from the binary files, and as privileged information we use
Fig. 5: Examples of malware assembly code transformation to
images
features, obtained from the assembly code. In such a way
we want to model a situation, when we have resources to
perform reverse-engineering of a program in order to construct
a training sample, but we can not make it during a test phase
e.g. due to restrictions on computational resources.
For each of the nine malware classes we consider the
following problem statement:
• We select one of the nine classes,
• As a train set we use half of patterns from the selected
class,
• As a test set we use patterns from another half of
the selected class, as well as patterns from other eight
classes. We consider patterns from the selected class to be
“normal” and patterns from other classes as “abnormal”,
• We use predictions on the test set to calculate area under
the precision/recall curve.
We do not want to claim that such setup of experiments is
indeed fully reflects a specificity of cybersecurity applications.
In fact through experiments on this real malware data we
would like to show that privileged information can increase
model accuracy, and so our approach is useful for cyber
security applications.
As in the previous subsection, here we also perform com-
parison with the original One-Class SVM. In figure 6 we
provide an example of how area under the precision/recall
curve depends on the parameters. We can notice that it almost
does not depend on the regularization parameter ν.
(a) One-Class SVM (b) One-Class SVM+
Fig. 6: Malware Detection problem. Dependence of anomaly
detection accuracy on the regularization parameters ν and γ,
and on the Gaussian kernel widths σ and σ∗
Algorithm/Malware Class 1 2 3 4 5
OneClassSVM 0.67 0.93 0.97 0.69 0.57
OneClassSVM+ 0.81 0.95 0.99 0.72 0.57
Algorithm/Malware Class 6 7 8 9
OneClassSVM 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.60
OneClassSVM+ 0.81 0.85 0.87 0.62
TABLE II: Malware Detection problem. Comparison of accu-
racies of the One-Class SVM and the One-Class SVM+
Values of the parameters ν and σ, selected for the One-
Class SVM by the cross-validation procedure, are also used
for the One-Class SVM+. Thus, for the One-Class SVM+ we
only tune values of the regularization γ and the kernel width
σ∗ in the privileged feature space. We expect that in case of a
small kernel width σ∗ and a big value of γ we obtain results
similar to that of the One-Class SVM.
We provide obtained results in table II. For some malware
classes privileged information allows getting significant in-
crease in accuracy of anomaly detection. For other malware
classes accuracies of the One-Class SVM and the One-Class
SVM+ turned out to be the same thanks to the fact, that for
specific values of the kernel width in the privileged feature
space and specific values of the regularization parameter the
decision function of the One-Class SVM+ is close to the
decision function of the original One-Class SVM.
E. Comparison with Related Approaches
In [15] and [16] (we provide the review of the related
methods in section IV) authors describe results of experiments
on real datasets. In particular, in [15] results of experiments
on four datasets are described, and in [16] only two datasets
are used among those, which are considered in [15]. In order
to compare approaches from [15] and [16] with methods,
proposed in this paper, we use one of these two samples —
the sample Abalone. Results of experiments for other datasets
are similar.
The Abalone dataset contains size and weight of molluscs,
as well as their age, evaluated from a number of rings on a
shell. Patterns are divided into two groups depending on the
Feature/Method One-ClassSVM [15]
SVDD
[16]
One-Class
SVM+
Length 0.670 0.673 0.702
Height 0.730 0.728 0.751
Whole weight 0.715 0.710 0.744
TABLE III: Comparison with related approaches. Accuracy
Values
value of the parameter “Rings”. Patterns with Rings < 7 are
considered as a normal class, the rest patterns are considered
to be anomalies.
Let us construct several blocks of privileged information.
For this we divide the dataset into two groups w.r.t. to param-
eters “Length” (Length < 0.5), “Height” (Height < 0.15) and
“Whole weight” (Whole weight < 0.8). Each such division
can be encoded by a binary vector, which we use as an addi-
tional information during the training phase. We perform three
experiments. In each of the experiments we use one of these
blocks of privileged information. We evaluate classification
accuracy by the ten-fold cross-validation procedure.
In the previous sections we use area under the preci-
sion/recall curve in order to evaluate performance of anomaly
detection algorithms. Unfortunately, in [16] the authors pro-
vide only accuracy values, therefore in this section for com-
parability we also provide only accuracy values. Results are
given in table III. We can see that the parametrization of the
One-Class SVM+, proposed in this paper, allowed us to find
more efficient solution. Also let us note that results of the
One-Class SVM from [15] and of the SVDD from [16] are
comparable.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We provide modifications of the approaches for one-class
classification problem that allows to incorporate privileged
information. We can see from the results of experiments
that in some cases privileged information can significantly
improve anomaly detection accuracy. In cases when privileged
information is not useful for a problem at hand thanks to the
structure of the corresponding optimization problem (e.g. cf.
(1) with (5)) privileged information will not have a significant
influence on the corresponding decision function: e.g. since
for γ  1 the solution of (5) is close to the solution of (1),
then the decision function of the One-Class SVM+ is close to
the decision function of the original One-Class SVM.
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